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ABSTRACT
As public displays continue to deliver increasingly private and
personalized content, there is a need to ensure that only the
legitimate users can access private information in sensitive con-
texts. While public displays can adopt similar authentication
concepts like those used on public terminals (e.g., ATMs), au-
thentication in public is subject to a number of risks. Namely,
adversaries can uncover a user’s password through (1) shoulder
surfing, (2) thermal attacks, or (3) smudge attacks. To address
this problem we propose GTmoPass, an authentication archi-
tecture that enables Multi-factor user authentication on public
displays. The first factor is a knowledge-factor: we employ a
shoulder-surfing resilient multimodal scheme that combines
gaze and touch input for password entry. The second factor is
a possession-factor: users utilize their personal mobile devices,
on which they enter the password. Credentials are securely
transmitted to a server via Bluetooth beacons. We describe the
implementation of GTmoPass and report on an evaluation of
its usability and security, which shows that although authen-
tication using GTmoPass is slightly slower than traditional
methods, it protects against the three aforementioned threats.
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ACM Classification Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Public displays deliver various kinds of tangible benefits and
are now deployed in train stations, airports, and streets. Mean-
while, there is an increasing demand for displays to offer
personalized, context-specific content [7, 21, 23].
There are many cases in which users need to securely authenti-
cate at public displays. For example, while a group of tourists
examine places to visit on a large public display, the system
could allow users to buy tickets for museums, buses, etc. One
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the
author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
PerDis ’17, June 07-09, 2017, Lugano, Switzerland
© 2017 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
ISBN 978-1-4503-5045-7/17/06. . . $15.00
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3078810.3078815
Please enter your password
on your mobile device
Touch (4) Gaze (Right) Touch (5) Gaze (Left)
Figure 1. We propose a Multifactor authentication architecture for pub-
lic displays. Users authenticate by entering a shoulder-surfing resilient
GazeTouch password (knowledge factor) on their personal mobile de-
vice (possession factor). Users simply need to launch the GazeTouch-
Pass app [19] that we modified so that it would securely communicate
the password to an authentication server, whose URL is received by the
phone through an Eddystone-URL broadcasted using a BLE Beacon.
or more users could then authenticate in parallel by entering
their passwords on their mobile devices. Using the mobile
device’s MAC address and the provided password, the system
validates the user’s credentials and charges the correct account
for the ticket fee. While there are scenarios where it might
be acceptable to continue the purchase and interaction on the
mobile device, in many cases it is favorable to keep the user at
the display to resume the primary task. In the aforementioned
example, tourists could then be shown further suggestions for
activities at the given place.
When exchanging sensitive data with a public display (e.g.,
login credentials), users are prone to several types of threats.
Namely, adversaries can uncover a user’s password in public
space through: (1) Shoulder surfing attacks: observing the
user while authenticating [14], (2) Thermal attacks: exploiting
the heat traces resulting from the user’s interaction with the
interface [1, 24], and (3) Smudge attacks: exploiting the oily
residues left after authenticating on touchscreens [3]. While
the latter two risks were demonstrated to be feasible, shoulder
surfing was shown to occur in daily contexts [14].
In this work we introduce GTmoPass, an authentication archi-
tecture that enables multi-factor user authentication on public
displays. GTmoPass uses a shoulder-surfing resilient multi-
modal scheme that combines Gaze and Touch for password
entry as a knowledge factor. Additionally it uses personal
mobile devices as a possession factor (see Figure 1). After en-
tering the password on the mobile device, the password is then
securely transferred to an authentication server whose URL
is communicated to the mobile device via Bluetooth beacons.
The use of BLE beacons alleviates the need to manually enter
URLs, or scan QR-codes. This means that when interacting
with public display that employs GTmoPass for the first time,
users do not have to do anything other than launching the app
and entering the password.
The results of our evaluation show that users authenticate
relatively fast (2.8 – 4.9 seconds), and that the authentication
process is resilient to the aforementioned threats. Even if the
password is leaked, the architecture of GTmoPass requires the
adversary to additionally acquire the user’s mobile device.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Authentication Factors
Researchers and practitioners have developed different ways
for users to authenticate in order to be granted access to Private
or sensitive information. Three of the most popular authen-
tication forms are (1) knowledge-based authentication, (2)
possession-based authentication, and (3) inherence-based au-
thentication (also known as biometric authentication).
Knowledge Factor
Knowledge-based authentication schemes rely on “something
the user knows”. It is perhaps the most commonly used fac-
tor [2]. Examples are passwords, PINs, and graphical pass-
words. Researchers also developed ways to authenticate using
eye movements [8, 12, 13, 16], mid-air gestures [25], and
by recalling photographs [26]. Knowledge-based schemes
allow changing passwords, and can be integrated into any
system that accepts any kind of user input. On the other
hand, knowledge-based passwords can be guessed by illegit-
imate users. Attackers can find the password by observing
users during authentication [14]. Smudge attacks are possible
when passwords are entered through touchscreens [3]. Graphi-
cal passwords such as Android lock patterns are particularly
vulnerable to smudge attacks [29, 40]. Furthermore, many
knowledge-based schemes are also vulnerable to thermal at-
tacks, where heat traces resulting from the user’s interactions
with the interface are exploited to find the password [1].
Possession Factor
The possession factor relies on “something the user possesses”.
Physical keys and scannable personal IDs are examples of
possession-based authentication. Researchers experimented
with identifying users on public displays through the MAC
address of their smartphone [28]. Davies et al. [7] exploit the
user’s mobile device to identify the list of applications the user
wants to interact with on a display. Others approaches include
using bluetooth devices [6] and wearable shutter glasses [32].
While this type of schemes does not require users to remember
passwords, it requires keeping possession of the access token.
A drawback of using this factor alone, is that if an attacker
gets hold of the access token, the attacker can impersonate the
user and gain unauthorized access.
Inherence Factor
The inherence factor relies on biometric data, such as finger-
prints, user behavior (e.g., behavior on a touchscreen [10] or
eye-gaze behavior [33]) and face detection [15]. While biomet-
ric authentication can be easy and fast to use, it is accompanied
with a number of problems. Biometric passwords cannot be
changed; once a user’s biometric data (e.g., fingerprint or iris
scan) is leaked, there is no way the user can invalidate the
leaked data. Face recognition can be bypassed using pictures
of the legitimate user [22], and users leave fingerprints every-
where as they interact with surrounding objects. Furthermore,
users are oftentimes concerned about disclosing their biomet-
ric data to third-party companies [27], especially after it was
found that biometric data can be stolen remotely [34, 42].
Multifactor Authentication
Multifactor authentication refers to the use of two or more
of the aforementioned factors for improved security. This
approach is employed by ATM machines; users have to know a
PIN, and have to possess an ATM card. The approach has also
been adopted by multiple Internet services, such as Google,
Facebook, Microsoft, and Dropbox; users have to know their
username and password, and have to possess a previously
identified mobile device on which they receive an additional
one-time password, or confirm their log-in attempt.
Researchers developed systems where users authenticate at
ATMs by entering PINs on their mobile phones [4, 30, 31]. De
Luca and Frauendienst introduced PocketPIN, where users can
enter credit card data on their phones before being securely
transmitted to public terminals [9].
The advantage of GTmoPass is that it employs multimodal
authentication as a knowledge factor, and personal mobile
devices as a possession factor. Multimodal authentication was
shown to be highly resilient to shoulder surfing [19]. Fur-
thermore, thermal and smudge attacks normally require the
attacker to inspect the interface after the user had left [1, 3].
Our architecture complicates these attacks by relying on the
user’s mobile device for input. This means that an attacker
can only perform these attacks by stealing the mobile device
fast enough before the heat or smudge traces can no longer be
traced. And even by doing so, the attacker would not be able
to identify the gaze-input.
Protecting Privacy on Public Displays
In addition to the aforementioned works by Davies et al. [6,
7] and Schaub et al. [28], other works exploited proxemics
for showing content on public displays. For example, Vogel
and Balakrishnan show private content on public displays only
when the user is very close to the display [36]. Brudy et al.
proposed some concepts to hide private data on public displays
by partially hiding the private data from the observer’s view
estimated by a Kinect [5].
GTMOPASS
GTmoPass is an authentication architecture that enables secure
multifactor user authentication on public displays. In the
following we describe the concept and implementation of
GTmoPass, and which threat models it is optimized against.
Concept
GTmoPass relies on two factors (1) a knowledge factor: we
use a multimodal authentication scheme that combines gaze
and touch input, and (2) a possession factor: users enter the
multimodal passwords on their personal mobile devices.
The Knowledge Factor
For the knowledge factor in GTmoPass, we employ a modified
version of GazeTouchPass [19], a state-of-the art authentica-
tion scheme that is highly resilient to shoulder surfing attacks.
GazeTouchPass is a multimodal scheme that employs combi-
nations of touch-based PINs (0-9) and eye movements (gaze
gestures to the left and to the right). This means that it uses a
theoretical password space of 12n (10 digits + 2 gaze gestures)
where n is the length of the password. A password could be:
Gaze (left), Touch (2), Gaze (right), Touch (1).
The strength of GazeTouchPass lies in its use of two input
modalities. This adds complexity to shoulder surfing attacks,
as it requires the attacker to observe (1) the user’s input on the
touchscreen, and (2) the eye movements of the user.
The Possession Factor
For the possession factor in GTmoPass, we rely on the user’s
personal mobile device. The multimodal passwords are en-
tered on the mobile device; touch input is detected through
the touchscreen, and gaze input is detected through the front-
facing camera. The mobile device then communicates securely
with an authentication server, that validates the password and
signals the display to show the private information.
Implementation
GTmoPass consists of two main components: (1) the authenti-
cation server, and (2) the user’s mobile device (client).
Authentication Server
Implemented in NodeJS, the authentication server is config-
ured to receive HTTP requests. The server runs on a computer
(e.g., in our setup we used a laptop) that is connected to a WiFi
router. The IP address of the server is broadcasted using a
BEEKS BLE beacon1 in Google’s Eddystone protocol2. The
IP is broadcasted in Eddystone-URL data packets at a 10 Hz
rate (i.e., it broadcasts once every 100 ms), with a transmission
power of 0 dBm (≈ 50 meters).
The Client
GazeTouchPass [19] was implemented as an Android applica-
tion. It uses the OpenCV library3 and the Viola-Jones classi-
fier [35] to detect the user’s face and eyes. Afterwards, in a
manner similar to previous work [41, 43], the gaze direction
is estimated depending on the distance between each eye and
the center of the user’s face.
We further extended GazeTouchPass to communicate with the
authentication server. As soon as the modified app launches, it
1http://bluvision.com/beeks/
2https://developers.google.com/beacons/eddystone-eid
3http://opencv.org/platforms/android.html
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Figure 2. As a user approaches the display to be authenticated at, the
user would take out his/her personal mobile device and launch the mod-
ified GazeTouchPass app. The app receives the Eddystone-URL broad-
casted by the beacon and presents the log in screen. The user then enters
the multimodal password. The password is hashed using SHA 256 and
then securely transferred to the authentication server. The server vali-
dates the log in credentials and signals the display that the credentials
were correct/incorrect.
scans for beacons and connects to the nearest one that broad-
casts Eddystone URLs. The URL is then saved in the local
memory. Whenever the user provides four inputs, the system
hashes the input using SHA 256 and sends an HTTP request
to the server (see Figure 2). Similar to previous work [28], the
mobile device is uniquely identified through its MAC address.
EVALUATION
We previously evaluated the usability and observation resis-
tance of GazeTouchPass, to find that although it requires 1.6
more seconds that PINs [39], it is significantly more secure
against shoulder surfing compared to traditional PINs [19].
We also found that the structure of a multimodal password has
an influence on its security. Namely, passwords that contain
several switches from one modality to another, are more dif-
ficult to observe compared to those that have less switches.
For example, a password such as “left-2-right-1” has three
modality switches, and is hence harder to observe compared
to “left-right-2-1”, which has only one modality switch. The
reason is that attackers would have to switch attention between
the user’s fingers and the user’s eyes more often in the case of
passwords with more modality switches.
Another interesting insight from our previous evaluation of
GazeTouchPass, is that multimodal passwords that start or
end with gaze input were perceived by participants to be more
difficult to observe. While our previous study was designed to
focus on the effect of the number of switches in input modal-
ities on the observability of the password, in the currently
presented work we focus on the influence of the position of
the gaze input in the password on the usability and security of
the GazeTouch password.
Usability Study
The goals of this study are to: (1) collect feedback about the
use of GazeTouchPass in the proposed setup, and (2) under-
stand the influence of the gaze-input’s position on usability.
AB
Figure 3. Participants were recorded during the usability study as they
enter passwords using an HD video camera. The recorded videos were
used in the subsequent security study to simulate shoulder surfing at-
tacks. Figure A shows a user entering a touch input Touch(7), while
figure B shows a user performing a gaze gesture Gaze(Left).
Apparatus
We used a 48 inch Samsung TV (1920×1080 px) as a display.
We connected a laptop computer running a NodeJS server
that accepts HTTP requests. The server validates the received
passwords and updates the display’s content accordingly. We
recorded participants as they enter passwords from the side
(see Figure 3). An HD camera was positioned such that it
is close enough to show the touchscreen, and also the user’s
eyes. These videos were recorded to be used in the subsequent
security study, to simulate shoulder surfing attacks.
Design
Since we wanted to investigate the influence of the position
of the gaze input in the password, we experimented with four
conditions: (1) passwords that start with gaze input (GazeS-
tart), (2) passwords that end with gaze input (GazeEnd), (3)
passwords that start and end with gaze input (GazeStartEnd),
and (4) passwords with gaze input in the middle (GazeMiddle).
The study was designed as a repeated measures experiment.
Each participant performed 16 authentications (4 passwords×
4 conditions) using randomly generated passwords. In case of
conditions GazeStart and GazeEnd, participants entered two
passwords with one gaze input at the start/end of the password,
while the other two passwords had two gaze inputs at the
start/end of the password. Table 1 shows sample passwords.
Participants
We invited 16 participants to our lab (6 females), recruited
through mailing lists and social networks. Participants were
awarded with online shop vouchers or participation points. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Procedure
The experimenter first described the study and asked the partic-
ipants to sign a consent form. She then handed the participant
a mobile device with the modified version of GazeTouchPass
Condition Format Example
GazeStart startOne Gaze Touch Touch Touch L123
startTwo Gaze Gaze Touch Touch RL34
GazeEnd endOne Touch Touch Touch Gaze 943L
endTwo Touch Touch Gaze Gaze 53RR
GazeMiddle Touch Gaze Gaze Touch 7LL3
GazeStartEnd Gaze Touch Touch Gaze R82L
Table 1. Previous work reported that the position of the gaze input was
perceived by participants to have an influence on the password’s observ-
ability [19]. Hence we experimented with the above conditions to cover
possible positions of the gaze input in the password.
installed, and explained how it works. Each participant was al-
lowed to perform a training run per condition to get acquainted
with the system. The trial attempts were not included in the
analysis. At each authentication attempt, the experimenter
read out the password to be entered according to a previously
generated list that was randomized. The participant would
then enter the password, and observe the feedback on the dis-
play, which indicated whether or not the correct password was
detected. Afterwards participants were interviewed to learn
about their feedback, ideas and concerns about GTmoPass.
Results
To measure the impact of the position of gaze input on the
usability of the passwords, we measured the entry time and
the error count while authenticating.
Entry time was measured starting from the first input until the
last input was recognized. Figure 4 illustrates the time taken
to enter a password at every condition. A repeated measures
ANOVA (with Greenhouse-Geisser Correction due to violation
of sphericity) showed a significant effect of the gaze input’s po-
sition on the time it takes to enter a password (F1.8,27.5 = 9.1,
p < 0.05). Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction (α
= 0.05 / 6 comparisons = 0.0083) showed significant differ-
ences in entry time between GazeStart (M = 2863 ms, SD =
1525 ms) and GazeMiddle (M = 4959 ms, SD = 3141 ms), be-
tween GazeEnd (M = 3892 ms, SD = 3045 ms) and GazeMid-
dle (M = 4959 ms, SD = 3141 ms), and between GazeStar-
tEnd (M = 3757 ms, SD = 3852 ms) and GazeMiddle (M =
4959 ms, SD = 3141 ms). The other pairs were not signifi-
cantly different (p > 0.05). This means that passwords with
gaze in the middle are significantly slower than other cases.
Error count reflects the number of times the participant en-
tered the password incorrectly. Errors could occur either due
to entering the wrong gaze or touch input, or due to the system
detecting an incorrect gaze input due to poor lighting condi-
tions. Figure 5 shows the number of errors at each condition.
Qualitative Feedback collected at the end of the study
through semi-structured interviews revealed positive feedback
towards the system. Many participants reported that they liked
the idea of detecting eye movements through the smartphone’s
camera, and would imagine using it to authenticate on ATMs
instead of using cards and PINs Some participants suggested
using the system to open security doors. One participant sug-
gested using it for authentication on other digital devices.
Figure 4. Mean authentication times.
Figure 5. Number of attempts before a successful entry.
Security Study
Unlike existing systems, GTmoPass is resilient to to thermal
and smudge attacks by design. Heat traces and oily residues
can only uncover the touch part of the password, but not the
gaze input. Therefore in this study we focus on focus on
GTmoPass’s resilience to observation attacks.
Although previous work evaluated the impact of the number of
modality switches on the security of passwords [19]. Our aim
in this study was to understand the influence of gaze input’s
position on the observation resistance of the password.
Using the video material produced in the first study, we con-
ducted a second observability study that simulated a shoulder
surfing attack against a user authenticating using GTmoPass.
To do this, we invited 16 different participants and asked them
to simulate shoulder surfers by watching the recorded videos,
and trying to find the entered passwords (see Figure 6).
Threat Model
In our threat model, the user and the attacker are in public
space. The attacker is familiar with GTmoPass and how it
works. The attacker observes the user from an angle that
allows seeing both the touch input on the mobile device, and
the eye movements (see Figure 3). The distance between the
attacker and the user is close enough to see the touchscreen,
but far enough to reduce the effort of switching focus back
and forth between the user’s eyes and the device’s touchscreen.
After unveiling the password, the attacker tries to get hold of
the device and authenticate at the display.
Figure 6. Participants of the security study watched HD videos of the us-
ability study participants as they authenticated. The task was to find the
correct password. Participants were explained how the system works,
had a chance to try the application themselves, and were allowed to take
notes while watching the videos.
Participants and Reward mechanism
We invited 16 participants (9 females) through mailing lists
and social networks. None of them had participated in the
usability study. All participants were awarded either an online
shop voucher or participation points. In addition, they took
part in a lottery for an additional 10 EUR online shop voucher,
where the chance of winning increases as the participant suc-
cessfully attacks more passwords. This was done to encourage
participants to put a lot of effort in finding the passwords.
Design
This study also followed a repeated measures within subjects
design. Each participant watched 4 videos of successful au-
thentications from each condition (4 videos× 4 conditions
= 16 videos in total), each of which is a recording from a
different usability study participant.
Procedure and Apparatus
After arriving at our lab and filling out the consent form, the
experimenter explained the concept and the reward mechanism.
The videos were displayed and controlled by the experimenter
on a computer (1920 px× 1080 px). Participants were given a
pen and a paper and were allowed to take notes while watching
the videos (see Figure 6). Since each video was attacked once,
it was watched once and hence the duration of the attack
depends on the length of the video. They were also allowed
to try the application themselves. After watching the video
once, they provided up to three guesses, but were not told
whether their guesses were correct or not to avoid influencing
the perceived difficulty. We concluded with a questionnaire to
learn more about the perceived difficulty of attacks.
Results
To understand the impact of the position of gaze input on
the observability of the passwords, we measured the binary
success rate and the Levenshtein distance.
Success rate reflects how many passwords of each condition
were successfully observed. On the other hand, the Leven-
shtein distance indicates how close the guess is to the origi-
nal password [1, 19, 38]. Since our participants provided 3
guesses against each password they observed, only the guess
Mean values GazeStart GazeEnd GazeMiddle GazeStartEnd
Binary success rate
(0%=all incorrect;100%=all correct) 19% 16% 13% 16%
Levenshtein distance
(0=similar;4=completely different) 1.36 1.18 1.21 1.27
Perceived Difficulty
(1=very easy;4=very hard) 4 3 3.5 4
Table 2. We measured the binary success rate (i.e., whether or not the at-
tacker’s guess is correct) and the Levenshtein distance (i.e., how similar
the guesses are to the correct password). A low success rate and high Lev-
enshtein distance indicate high observation resistance and hence higher
security. The most secure passwords are the GazeMiddle, where only
13% of the passwords were observed successfully, and guesses were 55%
similar to the correct ones. Participants reported the perceived difficulty
of attacks before knowing whether their guesses were correct.
with the shortest distance (i.e., highest similarity) to the correct
password was considered for analysis.
Table 2 shows the average success rate and Levenshtein dis-
tance for each condition. While participants succeeded the
most when attacking GazeStart, their guesses had the longest
average distance from the correct password. Guesses against
GazeEnd were closest to the correct password (i.e., low dis-
tance) possibly because the attackers knew that each password
consists of 4 inputs, and after seeing two or three touch-inputs
they foresaw that the following inputs are gaze-based.
We also collected the perceived difficulty which participants
indicated through a Likert scale (5-points;1=very easy;5=very
hard). Table 2 shows that participants found all types difficult
to observe, but GazeStart and GazeStartEnd were perceived
to be more difficult compared to GazeEnd and GazeMiddle.
These values are in-line with the Levenshtein distances.
DISCUSSION
The proposed architecture enables usable and secure authenti-
cation on public displays. Users simply approach the display
with their unmodified personal mobile device that has our
app installed. The app retrieves the IP of the server that is
broadcasted by the BLE beacon, allowing the user to directly
authenticate without entering URLs or scanning QR codes.
A usability study shows that the use of multimodal passwords
in that setup is feasible, well perceived, and is only slightly
slower than the less secure PINs (von Zezschwitz et al. report
1.5 seconds for PIN-entry [39]). While users make few errors,
previous work has shown that users are willing to correct
errors on public displays [20]. A security study showed that
authentication is robust against observation attacks (only 13%-
19% successful attacks in optimal conditions), which is more
secure than PINs and several recently proposed systems. For
example, attacks against EyePassShapes [8], EyePIN [12],
GazeTouchPass [19] and XSide [11] had success rates of 42%,
55%, 19% and 9% – 38% respectively. Furthermore, the fact
that gaze-input does not leave traces on the device makes
GTmoPass secure against thermal and smudge attacks even if
the attacker gets hold of the mobile device.
Trade-off between Usability and Security
While authentication using PINs is fast, it is known to be inse-
cure and highly vulnerable to observation attacks [19, 37] and
thermal attacks [1]. On the other hand authentication using
multimodal passwords is more secure, but takes longer time
compared to PINs. While even a slight increase in authenti-
cation time on mobile devices has a big impact considering
that users unlock their mobile devices more than 50 times a
day [18], we argue that authentication on public displays does
not happen as often and hence a slight increase (between 1.3
and 2.5 seconds in our case) is not very significant.
In addition to the overall trade-off, we found that having gaze-
input in the middle of the password (GazeMiddle) is the least
likely to be successfully attacked, but also requires the longest
time to enter. In general, it was found that providing consec-
utive gaze inputs results in longer authentication times. This
was the case in GazeStartTwo and GazeEndTwo and GazeMid-
dle (see examples in Table 1). This is due to the time it takes
to perform a gaze gesture, look to the front again, then per-
form another gaze gesture. On the other hand, guesses against
GazeEnd are the closest to the actual password. We expect that
after observing two or three touch inputs, participants foresaw
that the following inputs could be gaze-based.
Perceived Difficulty of Shoulder Surfing
It is interesting that the perceived difficulty of attacks reported
by participants was more in-line with the Levenshtein dis-
tances rather than with the binary success rate. The Leven-
shtein distance metric evaluates how similar a guess is to the
actual password, which means that it also reflects how many
times digits or gaze gestures were observed correctly. This
means that unlike the binary success rate, participant’s confi-
dence in identifying particular inputs can be a valid indicator
of low Levenshtein distances.
It is not surprising that the final success rate does not correlate
with the perceived difficulty. In fact, previous work reported
that attackers often underestimate the perceived difficulty of
shoulder surfing. For example, in the work by George et
al. [17], the perceived difficulty of performing shoulder surfing
attacks changed drastically after trying to perform attacks.
CONCLUSION
In this work we showed that GTmoPass offers a secure au-
thentication architecture for public displays. A usability and
a security study showed that GTmoPass is usable and secure
against shoulder surfing. We also discussed how thermal and
smudge attacks are infeasible by design.
In the future, we want to evaluate more complicated threat
models. For example, a combination of a thermal attack to
uncover touch input and an observation attack to uncover gaze
input, or multiple consecutive observations by insiders (e.g.,
family members or work colleagues). Another interesting
threat model is the case of having two attackers: one observing
the eyes, while the other observes the touchscreen. We also
intend to conduct a field study to better understand how users
perceive GTmoPass in the wild. A further direction for future
work is to include a third inherence factor. This can be done
by scanning the finger print or by face detection using the
front-facing camera.
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